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PREVIEW; State v. Q. Smith: How far does Montana’s right against 
unwarranted search and seizure extend? 
Victoria Hill* 
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in State v. 
Q. Smith on Wednesday, November 3, 2021 at 9:30am via Zoom.1 Dwight 
J. Schulte is expected to appear on behalf of defendant and appellant, 
Quincy Smith. Austin Miles Knudsen, Brad Fjeldeim, and William E. 
Fulbright are expected to appear on behalf of plaintiff and appellee, the 
State of Montana. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The main issue in State v. Q. Smith is whether Deputy Monaco 
violated Smith’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution when he 
followed Smith’s vehicle onto a private driveway to complete a traffic 
stop, which was initiated on a public road.2 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Quincy Smith was living with his longtime friends, Jacques 
Hennequin and Jacques’ wife, Carlie, in their home on Hidden Valley 
Road, Florence, Montana.3 The Hidden Valley Road property is a five-
acre parcel in Ravalli County, Montana, with a fence around the property 
line and interior fence around the yard, house, and garage.4 On May 15, 
2019, Smith and Hennequin were returning home from looking at the 
house that Quincy and his family had just made an offer to purchase, about 
three-quarters of a mile away from his residence.5 Smith and Hennequin 
drove eastbound on Hidden Valley Road to return to their residence.6 
Ravalli County Sheriff Deputy Nicholas Monaco was driving 
westbound on Hidden Valley Road that night.7 When Monaco observed 
Smith’s vehicle traveling eastbound, he believed Smith’s vehicle was 
travelling 57 mph in a 40-mph zone. Monaco then activated his lights, 
 
*J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law Class of 2023. 
1 The argument will be live-streamed and can be accessed through the Court's website at 
http://strearn.vision.net/MT-JUD/. 
2 Brief of Appellee at 1, State v. Q. Smith, https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId? 
DocId=357250 (Mont. June 25, 2021) (No. DA 20-0382). 
3 Brief of Appellant at 2, State v. Q. Smith, https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId? 
DocId=345802 (Mont. Feb. 19, 2021) (No. DA 20-0382). 
4 Id. at 3. 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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turned his vehicle around, attempted to catch up to Smith’s vehicle, and 
observed it turn down a residential driveway.8 
Smith and Hennequin pulled into their driveway and exited Smith’s 
vehicle.9 Smith and Hennequin waited outside the vehicle in the driveway 
for Monaco to exit his vehicle, informed Monaco that he was on their 
private property, and asked him to leave.10 While Monaco was in his patrol 
vehicle behind them in the driveway, he called in a “blackout out at res,” 
indicating a parked vehicle11 with its lights off.12 Monaco also requested 
backup in “code protocol,” the highest protocol possible,13 due to “two 
uncooperative males.”14  
Several minutes later, Ravalli County Sheriff Sergeant Jered 
Guisinger arrived at the scene.15 During this time, Smith repeatedly asked 
Monaco to leave the private property and return with a warrant.16 After 
Guisinger arrived, Monaco told Smith he was under arrest.17 Smith turned 
around and raised his hands in the air.18 Five seconds after exiting his 
vehicle, Guisinger then shot Smith in the back with his taser without 
warning.19 
Smith was searched, seized, and cited20 for speeding, obstructing a 
police officer, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (first 
offense), and resisting arrest.21 Before Smith’s trial in justice court, Smith 
filed a Motion to Suppress and Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results, 
arguing, “law enforcement entered private property, against the express 
instructions of [Smith] and the property owner, [Hennequin], and made an 
unlawful search and arrest.”22 Both motions were denied, and Smith was 
found guilty on all charges at his bench trial on February 19, 2020.23 
Smith appealed to the District Court the same day.24 The District 
Court denied Smith’s motions on May 26, 2020, finding that Monaco 
“pursued [Smith] in furtherance of a lawful investigatory stop under 
 
8 Id. 
9 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 8. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 4. 
13 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 8. 
14 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 4. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
22 Id. at 2. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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[Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-401].”25 Smith then appealed to the Montana 
Supreme Court.26 
The parties dispute whether Monaco’s patrol lights were visible to 
Smith before Smith’s vehicle entered the residential driveway. Smith 
maintains that he did not see Monaco’s patrol lights until he parked at 
home and exited his vehicle.27 Monaco testified that his lights were 
activated before Smith made a substantial turn around a corner on Hidden 
Valley Road.28 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A. Appellant’s Arguments 
Smith offers two arguments: (1) Smith had a reasonable right to 
privacy from Monaco’s search because Smith was in the curtilage of his 
residence; and (2) no exigent circumstances existed that would allow 
Monaco’s warrantless entry onto Smith’s property.29 
First, Smith argues that he had a reasonable right to privacy because 
he was a resident of the home and was within the curtilage of his residence 
at the time of the warrantless search.30 Although Smith was not the owner 
of the home at Hidden Valley Road, Smith argues that he had an 
expectation of privacy even as a guest in Hennequin’s home.31 Under the 
precedent set in Minnesota v. Olson,32 even an overnight guest has an 
expectation of privacy.33 
Furthermore, Smith argues he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because he was within the curtilage of his residence.34 Smith references 
that Montana extended the right to privacy on private land in State v. 
Bullock,35 which held 
Where that expectation [of privacy] is evidenced by fencing, ‘No 
Trespassing,’ or similar signs, or ‘by some other means [which] 
indicate[s] unmistakably that entry is not permitted’ entry by law 
enforcement officers requires permission or a warrant.36 
 
25 Id. 
26 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 2. 
27 Id. at 7. 
28 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 3. 
29 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 12, 16. 
30 Id. at 12–16. 
31 Id. at 12–13. 
32 495 U.S. 91 (1990).  
33 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 12–13 (citing Olson, 495 U.S. at 96–97). 
34 Id. at 13. 
35 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995).  
36 Brief of Appellant, supra note 13, at 13 (citing Bullock, 901 P.2d at 76). 
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Here, Smith argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the Hidden Valley Road property is fenced and had other 
indicators that entry was not permitted.37 At the time of the search, Smith 
was standing in front of the garage within the inner most of two fences, 
which he argues clearly delineated the curtilage of the residence.38 Smith 
also notes that the five-acre property is surrounded by foliage and 
landscaping to block view, was not readily visible from the public road, 
and could only be accessed by driving up a 350-foot private driveway, and 
argues that these characteristics delineated the curtilage of the residence to 
indicate that entry was not permitted.39 Thus, Smith concludes that the 
search was unlawful because Smith has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy within the curtilage of Smith’s residence and Monaco did not have 
a warrant or permission to enter the curtilage of Smith’s residence.40 
Next, Smith argues that no exigent circumstances existed that would 
permit Monaco’s warrantless entry by comparing the facts here with this 
Court’s precedent in State v. Saale.41 In Saale, the defendant was involved 
in a vehicle roll-over accident and fled the scene of the accident, returning 
to her home.42 When officers arrived at Saale’s house, Saale’s husband 
denied them entry.43 The officers determined that they could enter Saale’s 
house without a warrant due to the exigent circumstances of Saale’s 
potential intoxication and trying to elude officers.44 However, the Court 
rejected the notion that possibly being intoxicated and trying to elude 
officers were exigent circumstances that allowed a warrantless entry into 
Saale’s home.45 Smith argues that the facts here are similar to Saale, and 
therefore the Court should find for Smith.46  
Finally, Smith rebuts the State’s argument that the hot pursuit warrant 
exception is applicable here.47 Hot pursuit, or fresh pursuit, is the right of 
a police officer to make a warrantless search of a fleeing suspect or of the 
place to which the suspect has fled.48 Smith cites State v. Sorenson49 to 
support his argument that the theory of hot pursuit “is not available to 
peace officers unless a felony has been committed and the suspect is 
fleeing.”50 But here, Smith was never suspected of having committed a 
 
37 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 13. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 13–14. 
40 Id. at 16. 
41 204 P.3d 1220; Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 16–20. 
42 Id. at 17–18; Saale, 204 P.3d at 1221. 
43 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 18 (citing Saale, 204 P.3d at 1222). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (citing Saale, 204 P.3d at 1221–1223). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 19. 
48 Fresh Pursuit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
49 590 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1979).  
50 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 19 (citing Sorenson, 590 P.2d at 139). 
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felony.51 Rather, Smith argues that his investigation for a speeding 
violation exempts Monaco’s warrantless search from the theory of hot 
pursuit.52 
B. Appellee’s Arguments 
The State offers two arguments: (1) Smith could not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this case; and (2) the theory of hot pursuit ought 
to apply here.53 
First, the State argues Smith could not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy by attempting to distinguish the facts in Bullock with the facts 
here.54 First, the State distinguishes the temporal nature of the Fourth 
Amendment violations alleged between Bullock and Smith, noting that law 
enforcement in Bullock investigated a crime hours later, whereas Monaco 
investigated an immediate speeding violation.55 Another distinction the 
State offers is that the layout of the property involved differs from Bullock 
because Smith did not have “no trespassing” signs posted, the exterior 
fence is not a “privacy fence,” and there were no closed gates on the 
property.56 The final distinction the State offers is Smith’s assertion that 
Monaco leave the property was “more of an indication of not wanting to 
have any interaction with law enforcement than an exercise of [Smith and 
Hennequin’s] privacy rights in the driveway.”57 
Next the State argues that its interest outweighs Smith’s expectation 
of privacy in the driveway of his residence because the theory of hot 
pursuit ought to apply in this case.58 While the State concedes that 
Sorenson states that the doctrine of hot pursuit is unavailable to peace 
officers until a felony has been committed and the suspect is fleeing,59 the 
State argues that Montana law provides that the driver of a motor vehicle 
may be arrested without a warrant if the arresting officer is in uniform and 
displays the officer’s badge of authority and observes the recording of the 
speed of the vehicle by radio microwaves or other electrical device.60 
Furthermore, in opposition to Smith’s comparison of the facts here 
with the facts in Bullock, the State argues that the facts here more closely 




53 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 10, 13, 22. 
54 Id. at 11–16. 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 Id. at 15. 
57 Id. at 15–16. 
58 Id. at 13. 
59 Id. at 17 (citing Sorenson, 590 P.2d at 139). 
60 Id. at 13–14 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-703(1)(A) (2019)). 
61 413 P.3d 207 (Ariz. 2018). 
62 Id. at 19. 
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Hernandez, the State argues that Smith impliedly consented to Monaco’s 
presence and interaction by choosing to lead the officer on the private 
property.63 The Hernandez court used a reasonableness balancing test 
between an individual’s expectation of privacy against the officer’s 
reasons for being on the private property.64 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches. 
Montana’s Constitution grants specific privacy rights beyond those of the 
United States Constitution.65 Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution 
states, “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a 
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling 
state interest.” In determining if a search violated the Montana 
Constitution, the Court will look to two factors: “(1) whether the person 
has an actual expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as 
objectively reasonable, and (2) the nature of the state’s intrusion.”66 
A. The Court will likely find that Smith had an actual expectation of 
privacy that society is willing to recognize as objectively 
reasonable. 
Warrantless searches and seizures conducted inside a home are per se 
unreasonable, subject to a few carefully drawn exceptions, such as exigent 
circumstances.67 Smith argues that Montana’s additional privacy rights 
under Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution and the Court’s 
precedent in Bullock favor extending this per se rule beyond the actual 
“home” to the “curtilage” of the residence.68 The Court here is unlikely to 
extend this per se rule because the Court has declined this invitation in 
favor of a circumstances test in numerous cases.69 
However, if the Court extends the per se unreasonable rule from State 
v. Wakeford,70 the question then becomes whether there were exigent 
circumstances that allowed for a warrantless search. This argument is 
difficult for the State to win, as the State bears the heavy burden of 
 
63 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 20. 
64 413 P.3d at 210. 
65 State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (Mont. 1995) (citing State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Mont. 
1977)).  
66 State v. Dunn, 172 P.3d 110, 113 (Mont. 2007) (quoting City of Whitefish v. Large, 80 P.3d 427 
(Mont. 2003)). 
67 State v. Wakeford, 953 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1998) (citing State v. Rushton, 870 P.2d 1355 (Mont. 
1994)). 
68 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
69 See generally State v. Staker, 489 P.3d 489, 496 (Mont. 2021); State v. Myran, 289 P.3d 118, 123 
(Mont. 2012); State v. Crites, 218 P.3d 500, 500 (Mont. 2009); State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 511 
(Mont. 2008); Dunn, 172 P.3d at 113.  
70 953 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1998).  
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showing the existence of exigent circumstances.71 While the State argues 
that Smith eluded law enforcement72 and that Monaco’s warrantless entry 
was justified under hot pursuit,73 the precedent set by Sorenson is clear: 
“the theory of hot pursuit is unavailable to peace officers until a felony has 
been committed and the suspect is fleeing.”74 If the Court finds that the 
search was per se unreasonable under Wakeford, and that there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry, then the Court must 
reverse Smith’s conviction. 
If the Court refuses to extend Wakeford, it will determine whether 
Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy by weighing the 
circumstances of the case, including “the place of the investigation; the 
control exercised by the person over the property; and the extent to which 
the person took measures to shield the property from public view to 
communicate that entry is not permitted.”75 The latter factor is the biggest 
point of contention in this case. The Court will likely find that Smith had 
an actual expectation of privacy that Montana will recognize as 
reasonable. The facts here are positioned somewhere between Bullock, 
where an expectation of privacy was found,76 and State v. Hubbel, where 
the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy on private land 
leading up and including the threshold of his residence.77 In Hubbel, a case 
which goes unmentioned by the State,78 the Court held that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in property leading to the front door of 
the residence79 because there was not a fence separating the property from 
the highway, no shrubs or bushes to shield the property from public view, 
and no posted signs indicating that entry was not permitted.80 Smith 
distinguishes the facts here from those in Hubbel81 by offering evidence of 
the shrubbery and fencing around the property that prevent visitors from 
observing what is in plain view.82 While the State attempts to distinguish 
the curtilage in Bullock that was labeled with “No Trespassing” signs,83 
the Court in Bullock offers other alternatives to signage to delineate private 
property84 that are appropriately raised by Smith.85 Thus, Q. Smith is more 
 
71 Id. at 1069 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984)). 
72 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 14. 
73 Id. at 13. 
74 590 P.2d 136, 139 (1979). 
75 State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d 971, 977 (Mont. 1997) (referencing Bullock, 901 P.2d at 76). 
76 901 P.2d at 76. 
77 951 P.2d at 977. 
78 See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note 2. 
79 Hubbel, 951 P.2d at 977. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 978. 
82 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 3–6. 
83 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 15. 
84 See State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 76 (Mont. 1995) (citing People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 
(N.Y. 1992)). 
85 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
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akin to Bullock, and the facts favor a finding of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
Furthermore, public policy favors finding that Smith had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. On a balancing of interests and burdens, the State 
has a low interest in pursuing misdemeanants without a warrant, and a low 
burden in obtaining a warrant. Monaco had the ability to obtain a warrant 
and did obtain a warrant later to obtain a sample of Smith’s blood.86 
Monaco testified: 
Q: Did you ever get a warrant? 
A: I obtained a telephonic search warrant for the Defendant’s blood, 
but not a warrant with regard to any other aspect of the stop. 
Q: But you had the ability to get a warrant, as evidenced by the fact 
that you received one for the blood? 
A: Yes. 87 
In contrast to the low burden on the state, Montanans have a high 
interest in maintaining their Fourth Amendment rights, as the Montana 
Constitution explicitly requires the showing of a compelling state interest 
to justify infringements on an individual’s privacy rights.88 
As a matter of public policy, if the only reason that Smith does not 
have a privacy interest within the curtilage of his residence is because he 
failed to post “no trespassing signs,”89 while offering several other means 
of delineating the curtilage of the residence,90 Montanans privacy rights 
are not as strong as the State Constitution claims. Because Q. Smith is more 
akin to Bullock, and because there is a strong public policy in favor of 
finding a right to privacy, the Court will likely find that Smith had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
B. The Court will likely find that the nature of the State’s intrusion 
was more than minimal. 
Next, the Court will consider the nature of the State’s intrusion.91 
Here, the Court must determine whether the state’s method of 
investigation is so personally invasive that the Court recognizes the 
intrusion as a search that requires further justification, such as a warrant 
or other special circumstances.92 In Hubbel, the Court considered the 
 
86 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
87 Id.  
88 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
89 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 15. 
90 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
91 Dunn, 172 P.3d at 114. 
92 State v. Scheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 727 (Mont. 1997) (referencing State v. Stubbs, 892 P.2d 547 (Mont. 
1995)). 
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officers entry onto private property as minimal because they “did nothing 
other than what any other casual visitor to the residence would do.”93 The 
Hubbel Court referenced that the police officers “did not ignore posted 
warnings, hop fences, open gates, or slip through bushes intended to screen 
the home from view.” While Smith attempts to maximize the importance 
of the bushes on the exterior of the home,94 considering that there were not 
“No Trespassing” signs posted and no closed gates,95 the facts here align 
more with the minimal intrusion found in Hubbel because the driveway at 
issue here is similar to the general parking area routinely used by other 
visitors in Hubbel. Similarly, in City of Whitefish v. Large,96 the Court held 
that officers’ entry through the common-area parking lot was not overly 
intrusive in the absence of no trespassing signs and gates.97 However, in 
Bullock, the Court explained that “what an individual seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”98 Here, although the driveway was a publicly accessible area, 
Smith verbally indicated that the State’s intrusion was not minimal by 
warning Monaco that he was on private property and requesting that 
Monaco leave immediately.99  
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Court in State v. Q. Smith has an opportunity to return to 
Bullock’s principle and reaffirm that Montana continues to hold that its 
Constitution affords citizens broader protection to the right to privacy than 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court will  
likely follow a facts and circumstances test to determine whether Smith 
had an actual expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as 
objectively reasonable, and the nature of the state’s intrusion. The Court 
will likely find that the facts in Q. Smith are similar to the facts in Bullock, 
and thus find that Smith had an actual expectation of privacy that society 
is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable, and that the nature of the 
state’s intrusion was enough to violate Smith’s rights against unwarranted 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Montana 
Constitution. 
 
93 951 P.2d 971, 977 (Mont. 1997). 
94 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 13. 
95 Hubbel, 951 P.2d at 977. 
96 80 P.3d 427 (Mont. 2003).  
97 Id. at 431. 
98 901 P.2d 61, 70 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
99 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 8. 
